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We discuss salient economic aspects of the Internet, including the possible
abolition of net neutrality by local broadband access networks as well as
potential incompatibilities and degradation of connectivity in the Internet
backbone.
The Internet is a global network of interconnected networks that connect
computers. The Internet allows data transfers as well as the provision of a
variety of interactive real-time and time-delayed telecommunications serv-
ices. Internet communication is based on common and public protocols.
Hundreds of millions of computers are presently connected to the Internet.
Figure 1 shows the expansion of the number of computers connected to the
Internet.
The vast majority of computers owned by individuals or businesses con-
nect to the Internet through commercial ‘Internet service provider’s (ISPs).
Educational institutions and government departments are also connected to
the Internet but typically do not offer commercial ISP services. Users con-
nect to the Internet either by dialing their ISP, connecting through cable
modems, or residential ‘digital subscriber line’ (DSL), or through corporate
networks. Typically, routers and switches owned by the ISP send the caller’s
packets to a local ‘point of presence’ (POP) of the Internet. Dial-up, cable
modem, and DSL access POPs as well as corporate networks dedicated ac-
cess circuits connect to high-speed hubs. High-speed circuits, leased from or
owned by telephone companies, connect the high speed hubs forming an
‘Internet backbone network’.
The Internet is based on three basic separate levels of functions of the
network:
 the hardware/electronics level of the physical network;
 the (logical) network level where basic communication and interoperabil-
ity is established; and
 the applications/services level.
Thus, the Internet separates the network interoperability level from the ap-
plications/services level. Unlike earlier centralized digital electronic commu-
nications networks, such as CompuServe, AT&T Mail, Prodigy, and early
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Figure 1 Internet survey host count, 1993–2006. Source: Internet Systems Con-
sortium. Online. Available at http://www.isc.org, accessed 29 January 2007
America On Line (AOL), the Internet allows a large variety of applications
and services to be run ‘at the edge’ of the network and not centrally.
Residential broadband access networks and net neutrality
Users pay ISPs for access to the whole Internet. Similarly, ISPs pay back-
bones for access to the whole Internet. ISPs pay per month for a pipe of a
certain bandwidth, presumably according to their expected use. When digital
content, for example, is downloaded by consumer A from provider B, both
sides, that is, both A and B, pay. Consumer A pays to his ISP through his
monthly subscription, and provider B pays similarly. In turn, ISPs pay to
their respective backbones through their monthly subscriptions. The present
regime on the Internet does not distinguish in terms of price (or in any other
way) between bits or information packets depending on the services that
these bits and packets are used for. This regime, called ‘net neutrality’, has
prevailed on the Internet since its inception. Presently, a bit or information
packet used for ‘voice over Internet protocol’ (VOIP), for search, email, for
an image, or for a video is priced equally as a part of the large number of
packets that correspond to the subscription services of the originating and
terminating ISP.
Taking advantage of a change in regulatory rules by the Federal Com-
munications Commission that reclassified the Internet as an ‘information
service’ rather than a ‘telecommunications service’, AT&T, Verizon and ca-
ble TV networks advocate price discrimination based on which application
and on which provider the bits they transport come from. These local
broadband access networks would like to abolish the regime of non-dis-
crimination which has been called ‘net neutrality’ and substitute for it a
complex price discrimination schedule where, besides the basic service for
transmission of bits, there will be additional charges by the Internet access
network levied to the originating party (such as Google, Yahoo or Microsoft
Network, MSN) even when the application provider is not directly connected
to the local access network.
The imposition of price discrimination on the provider side of the market
and not on the subscriber is a version of two-sided pricing. It is uniquely
possible for firms operating within a network structure. Besides traditional
networks, such two-sided pricing is also possible for intermediaries in ex-
change networks (such as the exchanges themselves). There is presently con-
siderable debate on the legality as well as the efficiency properties of the
implementation of such complex pricing strategies by broadband Internet
access networks, mainly because of the very considerable market power of
such firms.
Residential retail broadband Internet access customers may well have dif-
ficulty changing ISPs. Ninety-nine per cent of US households are offered
Internet access by at most two firms – a telephone company through DSL
and a cable TV company through a cable ‘modem’ – and many households
are facing a monopoly of either cable or DSL. There are also switching costs
to residential customers, such as changing equipment. Finally, residential
customers are much more affected by contracts that bundle broadband In-
ternet access with other services such as telecommunications and cable tel-
evision.
As discussed earlier, the Internet under net neutrality separated the net-
work layer from the applications/services layer. This allowed firms to inno-
vate ‘at the edge of the network’ without seeking approval from network
operator(s). The decentralization of the Internet based on net neutrality fa-
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cilitated innovation resulting in big successes such as Google, MSN, Yahoo,
and Skype. Net neutrality also increased competition among the applications
and services ‘at the edge of the network’ which did not need to own a
network to compete. Additionally, the existence of network effects on the
Internet implies that efficient prices to users on both sides (consumers and
applications) should be lower than in a market without network effects.
Instead we see an attempt to increase prices that will reduce network effects
and innovation.
Abolition of net neutrality raises both horizontal and vertical antitrust
issues. To start with horizontal issues, last-mile carriers (who are selling as a
duopoly or monopoly to residential consumers) may reduce capacity of
‘plain’ broadband Internet access service and/or degrade it so that they can
establish a ‘premium’ service for which they intend to charge content/ap-
plications providers whose content or application is used by residential sub-
scribers. Coordinated reduction of capacity in ‘plain’ service is reminiscent of
cartel behaviour. In general, the coordinated introduction of price discrim-
ination schemes may reduce output, which would reduce total surplus.
Therefore, introduction of coordinated price discrimination may have anti-
competitive consequences.
There is also a variety of potentially anti-competitive vertical effects. For
example, a carrier may favour its own content or application over the con-
tent of a competing carrier or a company that does not have its own network.
VOIP provided over broadband Internet competes with traditional circuit-
switched service provided by AT&T and Verizon, and could be subject to
discrimination. Additionally, both AT&T and Verizon are gearing to dis-
tribute video, and could favour their video services over those of others. But
the anti-competitive concerns are hardly limited to products and services
currently provided by the firms with market power in the access market. The
carriers can also leverage market power in broadband access to the content
or applications markets through contractual relationships. For example, a
carrier can contract with an Internet search engine to put it in ‘premium’
service while searches using other search engines face considerable delays
using ‘plain’ service. The question that confronts the US Congress in 2007 is
whether it should intervene by imposing non-discrimination restrictions or
wait instead for antitrust suits to filed and resolved. The crucial role of the
Internet in US economic growth argues in favour of pre-emptive restrictions.
Backbone issues
Backbone networks provide transport and routing services for information
packets among high-speed hubs on the Internet. Backbone networks vary in
terms of their geographic coverage. There is wide variance of ISPs in terms of
their subscriber size and the networks they own. However, irrespective of its
size, an ISP needs to interconnect with other ISPs so that its customers can
reach all computers/nodes on the Internet. That is, interconnection is nec-
essary to provide the universal connectivity on the Internet which is de-
manded by users. Internet networks interconnect in two ways: (a) private
bilateral interconnection, and (b) interconnection at public network access
points (NAPs). Private interconnection points and public NAPs are facilities
that provide collocation space and a switching platform so that networks are
able to interconnect. Interconnection services are complementary to Internet
transport. In a sense, the Internet backbone networks are like freeways and
the NAPs are like the freeway interchanges.
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Internet networks have contracts that govern the terms under which they
pay each other for connectivity. Payment takes two distinct forms: (a) pay-
ment in dollars for ‘transit’, and (b) payment in kind, that is, barter, called
‘peering’. Connectivity arrangements among ISPs encompass a seamless
continuum, including ISPs that rely exclusively on transit to achieve con-
nectivity, ISPs that use only peering to achieve connectivity, and everything
in between. Although there are differences between transit and peering in the
specifics of the payments method, and transit includes services to the ISP not
provided by peering, these two are essentially alternative payment methods
for connectivity. The transport and routing that backbone networks offer do
not necessarily differ depending on whether cash (transit) or barter (peering)
is used for payment.
Under transit, a network X connects to network Y with a pipeline of a
certain size, and pays network Y for allowing X to reach all Internet des-
tinations. Under transit, network X pays Y to reach not only Y and its peers,
but also any other network, such as network Z by passing through Y, as in the
diagram below.
XY ¼  ¼  ¼  ¼  ¼ Z
Under peering, two interconnecting networks agree not pay each other for
carrying the traffic exchanged between them as long as the traffic originates
and terminates in the two networks. In the diagram above, if X and Y have a
peering agreement, they exchange traffic without paying each other so long
as such traffic terminating on X originates in Y, and traffic terminating on Y
originates in X. If Y were to pass to X traffic originating from a network Z
that was not a customer of Y, Y would have to pay a transit fee to X (or get
paid a transit fee by X), that is, it would not be covered by the peering
agreement between X and Y.
Although the networks do not exchange money in a peering arrangement,
the price of the traffic exchange is not zero. If two networks X and Y enter
into a peering agreement, it means that they agree that the cost of trans-
porting traffic from X to Y and vice versa that is incurred within X is roughly
the same as the cost of transporting traffic incurred within Y. These two costs
have to be roughly equal if the networks peer, but they are not zero.
It is a commercial decision whether interconnection takes the form of
peering or transit payment. Peering is preferred when the cost incurred by X
for traffic from X to Y and Y to X is roughly the same as the cost incurred by
Y for the same traffic. If not, the networks will use transit. As I explain
below, the decision on whether to peer depends crucially on the geographic
coverage of the candidate networks.
Generally, peering does not imply that the two networks should have the
same size in terms of the numbers of ISPs connected to each network, or in
terms of the traffic that the two networks generate. If two networks, X and
Y, are similar in terms of the types of users to whom they sell services, the
amount of traffic flowing across their interconnection point(s) will be roughly
the same, irrespective of the relative size of the networks. For example,
suppose that network X has ten ISPs and network Y has one ISP. If all ISPs
have similar features, the traffic flow from X to Y is generally equal to the
traffic flow from Y to X.
What determines whether a peering arrangement is efficient for both net-
works is the cost of carrying the mutual traffic within each network. This cost
will depend crucially on a number of factors, including the geographic cov-
erage of the two networks. Even if the types of ISPs of the two networks are
the same as in the previous example (and therefore the traffic flowing in each
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direction is the same), the cost of carrying the traffic can be quite different in
network X from network Y. For example, network X (with the ten ISPs) may
cover a larger geographic area and have significantly higher costs per unit of
traffic than network Y. Then network X would not agree to peer with Y.
These differences in costs ultimately would determine the decision to peer
(barter) or receive a cash payment for transport.
Where higher costs are incurred by one of two interconnecting networks
because of differences in the geographic coverage of the networks, peering
would be undesirable from the perspective of the larger network. Similarly,
one expects that networks that cover small geographic areas will peer only
with each other. Under these assumptions, who peers with whom is a con-
sequence of the extent of a network’s geographic coverage, and may not have
any particular strategic connotation. In a theoretical model, Milgrom, Mi-
tchell and Srinagesh (2000) show how peering can emerge under some cir-
cumstances as an equilibrium in a bargaining model between backbones.
Structural conditions for Internet backbone services (ease of expansion
and entry) ensure low barriers to entry and expansion, and easy conversion
of other transport capacity to Internet backbone capacity. As discussed later,
raw transport capacity as well as Internet transport capacity have grown
dramatically. Transport capacity is almost a commodity because of its
abundance. The business environment for Internet backbone services is
competitive. Generally, ISPs buying transport services face flexible transit
contracts of relatively short duration. This is reflected in competitive pricing.
Economides (2006a) shows that AT&T and MCI had almost identical prices
for transit in 1999 when AT&T’s backbone business was significantly smaller
than MCI’s.
ISPs are not locked in by switching costs of any significant magnitude.
Thus, ISPs are in good position to change providers in response to any
increase in price, and it would be very difficult for a backbone profitably to
increase price. Moreover, a large percentage of ISPs has formal agreements
that allow them to route packets through several backbone networks and are
able to control the way the traffic will be routed (multi-homing).
When an ISP reaches the Internet through multiple backbones, it has
additional flexibility in routing its traffic through any particular backbone. A
multi-homing ISP can easily reduce or increase the capacity with which it
connects to any particular backbone in response to changes in prices of
transit. Thus, multi-homing increases the firm-specific elasticity of demand of
a backbone provider. Therefore, multi-homing severely limits the ability of
any backbone services provider to profitably increase the price of transport.
Any backbone increasing the price of transport will face a significant de-
crease in the capacity bought by multi-homing ISPs.
Large Internet customers also use multiple ISPs, which is called ‘customer
multi-homing’. They have chosen to avoid any limitation on their ability to
switch traffic among suppliers even in the very shortest of runs. Customer
multi-homing has similar effects as ISP multi-homing in increasing the firm-
specific elasticity of demand of a backbone provider and limiting the ability
of any backbone services provider to profitably increase the price of trans-
port.
Like any network, the Internet exhibits network effects. Network effects
are present when the value of a good or service to each consumer rises as
more consumers use it, everything else being equal – see Economides (1996),
Farrell and Saloner (1985), Katz and Shapiro (1985), and Liebowitz and
Margolis (1994). In traditional telecommunications networks, an additional
customer to the network increases the value of a network connection to all
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other customers, since each of them can now make an extra call. On the
Internet, an additional user potentially
 adds to the information that all others can reach;
 adds to the goods available for sale on the Internet;
 adds one more customer for e-commerce sellers;
 adds to the number of people who can send and receive e-mail or otherwise
interact in through the Internet.
Thus, the addition of an extra computer node increases the value of an
Internet connection to each connection.
In networks of interconnected networks, there are large social benefits
from the interconnection of the networks and the use of common standards.
A number of networks of various ownership structures have harnessed the
power of network externalities by using common standards. Examples of
interconnected networks of diverse ownership that use common standards
include the telecommunications network, the network of fax machines, and
the Internet. Despite the different ownership structures in these three net-
works, the adoption of common standards has allowed each of them to reap
huge network-wide benefits.
As the variety and extent of the Internet’s offerings expand, and as more
customers and more sites join the Internet, the value of a connection to the
Internet rises. Because of the high network externalities of the Internet,
consumers on the Internet demand universal connectivity, that is, to be able
to connect with every website on the Internet and to be able to send elec-
tronic mail to anyone. This implies that every network must connect with the
rest of the Internet in order to be a part of it. The demand for universal
connectivity on the Internet is stronger than the demand of a voice tele-
communications customer to reach all customers everywhere in the world. In
the case of voice, it may be possible but very unlikely that a customer might
buy service from a long-distance company that does not include some remote
country because the customer believes that it is very unlikely that he or she
would be making calls to that country. On the Internet, however, one does
not know where content is located. If company A did not allow its customers
to reach region B or customers of a different company C, customers of A
would never be able to know or anticipate what content they would be
missing. Thus, consumers’ desire for Internet universal connectivity is
stronger than for voice telecommunications. Additionally, because connec-
tivity on the Internet is two-way, a customer of company A would be losing
exposure of his or her content (and the ability to send and receive e-mails) to
region B and customers of company C. It would be difficult for customer A
to calculate the extent of the losses accrued to him or her from such actions
of company A. Thus, again, customers on the Internet require universal
connectivity.
In markets with network externalities, firms may create bottleneck power
by using proprietary standards. A firm controlling a standard needed by new
entrants to interconnect their networks with the network of the incumbent
may be in a position to exercise market power (see Economides, 2006b).
Often a new technology will enter the market with competing incompatible
standards. Competition among standards may have the snowball character-
istic attributed to network externalities.
Economics literature has established that using network externalities to
affect market structure by creating a bottleneck requires three conditions (see
Economides, 1996; 1989; Farrell and Saloner, 1985; Katz and Shapiro, 1985):
 networks use proprietary standards;
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 no customer needs to reach nodes of or to buy services from more than
one proprietary network; and
 customers are captives of the network to which they subscribe and cannot
change providers easily and cheaply.
First, without proprietary standards, a firm does not have the opportunity to
create the bottleneck. Second, if proprietary standards are possible, the de-
velopment of proprietary standards by one network isolates its competitors
from network benefits, which then accrue to only one network. The value of
each proprietary network is diminished when customers need to buy services
from more than one network. Third, the more consumers are captive and
cannot easily and economically change providers, the more valuable is the
installed base to any proprietary network. I show below that these conditions
fail in the context of the Internet backbone.
For example, if universal connectivity were not offered by a backbone
network, a customer or its ISP would have to connect with more than one
backbone. This would be similar to the period 1895–1930 when a number of
telephone companies run disconnected networks. Eventually most of the
independent networks were bought by AT&T, which had a dominant long-
distance network. The refusal of AT&T to deal and interconnect with in-
dependents was effective for three key reasons: (a) AT&T controlled the
standards and protocols under which its network ran; (b) long-distance
service was provided exclusively by AT&T in most of the United States; and
(c) the cost to a customer of connecting to both AT&T and an independent
was high. None of these reasons applies to the Internet. The Internet is based
on public protocols. No Internet backbone has exclusive network coverage
of a large portion of the United States. Finally, connecting to more than one
backbone (multi-homing) is a common practice by many ISPs and does not
require big costs. And ISPs can interconnect with each other through sec-
ondary peering, as explained below. Thus, the economic factors that allowed
AT&T to blackmail independents into submission in the first three decades
of the 20th century are reversed in today’s Internet backbone, and therefore
would not support a profitable refusal to interconnect by any backbone.
The Internet fails to fulfill any of the three necessary conditions stated
above under which a network may be able to leverage network externalities
and create a bottleneck. First, there are no proprietary standards on the
Internet, so the first condition fails. The scenario of standards wars is not at
all applicable to Internet transport, where full compatibility, interconnection
and inter-operability prevail. For Internet transport, there are no proprietary
standards. There is no control of any technical standard by service providers
and none is in prospect. Internet transport standards are firmly public prop-
erty (Kahn and Cerf, 1999; Bradner, 1999). As a result, any seller can create a
network complying with the Internet standards – thereby expanding the
network of interconnected networks – and compete in the market.
In fact, the existence and expansion of the Internet and the relative decline
of proprietary networks and services, such as CompuServe, can be attributed
to the conditions of inter-operability and the tremendous network external-
ities of the Internet. AOL, CompuServe, Prodigy, MCI and AT&T folded
their proprietary electronic mail and other services into the Internet. Micro-
soft, thought to be the master of exploiting network effects, made the error of
developing and marketing the proprietary MSN. After that product failed to
sell, Microsoft re-launched the Microsoft Network as an Internet service
provider, adhering fully to the public Internet standard. This is telling ev-
idence of the power of the Internet standard and demonstrates the low like-
internet, economics of the 7
lihood that any firm can take control of the Internet backbone by imposing
its own proprietary standard.
Second, customers on the Internet demand universal connectivity, so the
second condition above fails. Users of the Internet do not know in advance
what Internet site they may want to contact or to whom they might want to
send e-mail. Thus, Internet users demand from their ISPs, and expect to
receive, universal connectivity. This is the same expectation that users of
telephones, mail and fax machines have: that they can connect to any other
user of the network without concern about compatibility, location, or, in the
case of telephone or fax, any concern about the manufacturer of the appli-
ance, the type of connection (wireline or wireless) or the owners of the net-
works over which the connection is made. Because of the users’ demand for
universal connectivity, ISPs providing services to end users or to websites
must make arrangements with other networks so that they can exchange
traffic with any Internet customer.
Third, there are no ‘captive’ ISPs on the Internet, so the third condition
fails, for a number of reasons:
 ISPs can easily and with low cost migrate all or part of their transport
traffic to other network providers;
 many ISPs already purchase transport from more than one backbone to
guard against network failures and for competitive reasons (ISP ‘multi-
homing’);
 many large websites/providers use more than one ISP for their sites (‘cus-
tomer multi-homing’); and
 competitive pressure from their customers makes ISPs agile and likely to
respond quickly to changes in conditions in the backbone market.
Competitive conditions imply that significant price increase, raising rivals’
costs or degrading interconnection are unlikely to be profitable on the In-
ternet backbone. If the large Internet backbone connectivity provider’s
strategy were to impose equal increases in transport costs on all customers,
the response of other backbone providers and ISPs would be to reduce the
traffic for which they buy transit from the large Internet backbone provider
(IBP) and to instead re-route traffic and purchase more transit from each
other. Thus, in response to a price increase by the large Internet backbone
connectivity provider, other IBPs and ISPs would reduce the traffic for which
they buy transit from the large IBP down to the minimum level necessary to
reach ISPs that are exclusively connected to the large IBP. All other IBPs and
ISPs would exchange all other traffic with each other bypassing the large IBP
network.
Figure 2 shows the typical reaction of an increase in the price of a large
IBP, and illustrates why the strategy of increasing price is unprofitable.
Consider, for example, a situation where, prior to the price increase, four
ISPs (1 to 4) purchase transit from IBP 0, which considers increasing its
price. Two of these ISPs (ISP 2 and ISP 3) peer with each other. ISP 1 and
ISP 4 buy transit capacity for all their traffic to IBP 0 and the other three
ISPs. ISP 2 and ISP 3 buy transit capacity for all their traffic to IBP 0, ISP 1
and ISP 4.
Now suppose that, IBP 0 increases its transit price. In response, ISP 1 and
ISP 4 decide to reduce the traffic for which they buy transit from IBP 0, and
instead to re-route some of their traffic and purchase more transit from ISP 2
and ISP 3 respectively. Because of the peering relationship between ISP 2 and
ISP 3, all traffic from ISP 1 handed to ISP 2 will reach ISP 3 as well as ISP 4,
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which is a customer of ISP 3. Similarly, by purchasing transit from ISP 3, ISP
4 can reach all the customers of ISP 1, ISP 2 and ISP 3. Thus, in response to
the price increase of IBP 0, each of the ISPs 1, 2, 3, and 4 will reduce the
amount of transit purchased from the IBP 0. Specifically, each of the ISPs
buys from IBP 0 only capacity sufficient to handle traffic to the customers of
network 0. This may lead to a considerable loss in revenues for IBP 0,
rendering the price increase unprofitable. The big beneficiaries of the price
increase of IBP 0 are peering ISPs 2 and 3, which now start selling transit to
ISPs 1 and 4 respectively and become larger networks.
In response to a price increase by the large IBP, rivals would be able to
offer their customers universal connectivity at profitable prices below the
large IBP’s prices. In the scenario described in the example above, market
forces, responding to a price increase by a large network, re-route network
traffic so that it is served by rival networks, except for the traffic to and from
the ISPs connected exclusively with the large network. The rivals purchase
the remaining share from the large IBP in order to provide universal con-
nectivity. Thus, the rivals’ blended cost would permit them to profitably offer
all transport at prices lower than the large IBP’s prices, but above cost.
A direct effect of the increase in price by the large network is that (a) ISPs
that were originally exclusive customers of the large IBP would shift a sub-
stantial portion of their transit business to competitors, and (b) ISPs that
were not exclusive customers of the large IBP would also shift a significant
share of their transit business to competitors’ networks, keeping the con-
nection with the large IBP only for traffic for which alternative routes do not
exist or for cases of temporary failure of the rivals’ networks.
Similarly, degradation of interconnection to all backbones or sequentially
one at a time is likely to be unprofitable. Degradation of interconnection to
all backbones is clearly dominated by a price increase (since a price increase
directly produces additional revenue to the firm, while interconnection deg-
radation does not directly increase revenue), and, as we have shown above,
competitive conditions severely limit price increases. Targeted degradation is
ISP 1
ISP 3
ISP 4
Transit agreement (traffic to
ISP 0 and ISPs
2, 3 and 4)
Transit agreement (traffic to
ISP 0 and ISPs
1, 2 and 3)
             
Peering agreement (traffic between ISPs 2 and 3)
Transit agreement
(traffic to ISP 0
and ISPs 1 and
4)
Transit agreement
(traffic to ISP 0
and ISPs 1 
and 4)
IBP 0
ISP 2
Figure 2 Traffic flows between ISPs and a backbone
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also unprofitable for a large network that would initiate it for several rea-
sons.
1. ISP clients of the targeted network are likely to switch to third IBP net-
works that are unaffected by the degradation; it is very unlikely that any
will switch to the degrading IBP network because it is itself degraded and
cannot offer universal connectivity; there is no demand reward to the large
IBP network.
2. Degradation of interconnection hurts all the ISP customers of the target-
ing IBP network as well, since they lose universal connectivity; these cus-
tomers of the large network would now be willing to pay less to the large
network; this leads to significant revenue and profit loss.
3. After losing universal connectivity, customers of the large IBP network
are likely to switch to other networks that are unaffected by degradation
and can provide universal connectivity; this leads to even further revenue
and profit loss for the degrading network.
4. Multi-homing ISPs would purchase less capacity from the large IBP net-
work, or even terminate their relationship with the large network, which
through its own actions sabotages their demand for universal connectivity;
this further reduces demand and profits for the degrading network; the
same argument applies to multi-homing customers of ISPs.
5. As the large IBP network pursues target after target, its customers face
continuous quality degradation while the target’s customers face only
temporary degradation; this would result in further customer and profit
losses for the large IBP network.
6. Prospective victims would seek alternative suppliers in advance of being
targeted by the large IBP network; the scheme cannot play out the way it
is proposed.
7. The degradation scheme is implausible in its implementation. How large
do networks need to be to become serial killers? Why have we not ob-
served this behaviour at all?
8. There is no enduring change to the number of competitors in a market
caused by serial degradation in a market with negligible entry barriers; the
eliminated rival is likely to be replaced by another.
In conclusion, competition on the Internet backbone is strong, with many
carriers and easy entry, and thus presently there are no significant compe-
tition concerns for Internet backbone services. However, local broadband
access is typically a duopoly or monopoly depending on location. As of 2007,
local broadband access networks were proposing to abolish the regime of net
neutrality and impose fees on content and applications providers. The le-
gality of this proposed change is questionable, and imposition of such price
discrimination may have adverse consequences for consumers’ total surplus.
Nicholas Economides
See also
<xref=C000543> computer industry.
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